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1 Introduction
This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation (TIE) mechanism of
Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [2] for combinatorial auctions. Recall that in a combinatorial auction, m
goods get allocated to n bidders. Each bidder i has a private valuation vi that describes its value vi(S) for
each subset S of goods. The social welfare of an allocation is the sum of the bidders’ values for the goods
received.
The mechanism of [2] is presented in a “lottery-value” oracle model, where each bidder can be queried
about his valuation by means of the following query: given a vector of probabilities over items x ∈ [0, 1]m,
what is the expected value E[vi(xˆ)], where xˆ is obtained by independently rounding each coordinate of x
to 0 or 1 with probability xi. Such queries can be answered efficiently for certain valuation functions (in
particular coverage functions), and this oracle model is a convenient framework for the presentation of the
mechanism of [2]. On the other hand, lottery-value queries are #P-hard to answer for the class of matroid
rank functions (see Section 4), and hence one can ask how realistic this model is in general. The purpose of
this manuscript is to show that the model is “approximately realistic” in the sense that the mechanism of [2]
can be implemented in the (weaker) value oracle model at the cost of relaxing the concept of truthfulness in
expectation to approximate truthfulness in expectation. (Here, we mean appoximation within an arbitrarily
small error, in the sense of an FPTAS.) In particular, we show that the maximal in distributional range
(MIDR) allocation rule of [2] can be implemented as an approximately MIDR allocation rule in the value
oracle model, and then we present a blackbox transformation from approximately MIDR allocation rules to
approximately TIE mechanisms.
First, let us define the approximate variants of MIDR and truthfulness in expectation. The exact variants
are obtained by setting ǫ = 0.
Definition 1.1. An allocation rule is (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximal-in-distributional range (or (1 − ǫ)-
MIDR) if there is a range of distributions over outcomes R such that, for every input, the mechanism
returns an outcome that is sampled from a distribution D∗ ∈ R that (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximizes the
expected social welfare Eω∼D[
∑
i vi(ω)] over all distributions D ∈ R.
We define approximate truthfulness in expectation in terms of relative utility error. This means that
truth-telling costs a bidder at most an ǫ fraction of his maximum-possible utility.
Definition 1.2. A mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is (1− ǫ)-approximately truthful-
in-expectation (or (1 − ǫ)-TIE) if, for every bidder i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation
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function v′i, and (reported) valuation functions v−i of the other bidders,
E[vi(A(vi, v−i))− pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[vi(A(v
′
i, v−i))− pi(v
′
i, v−i)]. (1)
The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The class of valuations of interest here is the following (as in [2]).
Definition 1.3. A function v : 2[m] → R+ is a weighted matroid rank sum if there are matroidsM1, . . . ,Mk
and weights α1, . . . , αk ≥ 0 such that
v(S) =
k∑
i=1
αirMi(S),
where rMi is the rank function of matroid Mi.
This definition also captures positive combinations of weighted rank functions, as the cones generated by
weighted and unweighted rank functions of matroids coincide.
The allocation rule of [2] is maximal-in-distributional-range, provides a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the
social welfare, and the corresponding TIE mechanism can be implemented in expected polynomial time
provided the bidders’ valuations are weighted matroid rank sums and support lottery-value queries. Our
goal here is to prove the following.
Theorem 1.4. For every ǫ = 1/poly(m,n), there is a (1− ǫ)-TIE mechanism that achieves a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-
approximation to the social welfare in combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations that
runs in polynomial time in the value oracle model.
We prove this claim in two steps. First, we prove the following.
Theorem 1.5. For every ǫ = 1/poly(m,n), there is a (1−ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that achieves a (1−1/e−
ǫ)-approximation to the social welfare in combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum bidders and
runs in polynomial time in the value oracle model.
Then, we prove the following general reduction.
Theorem 1.6. For every (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that is a c-approximation to the social welfare in
combinatorial auctions with bidders’ valuations restricted to a set C, there is a (1− ǫ′)-TIE mechanism that
is a (c−1/poly(m,n))-approximation to the social welfare in combinatorial auctions with bidders’ valuations
in C, where ǫ′ = ǫ · poly(m,n).
Therefore, by selecting a sufficiently (polynomially) small ǫ in Theorem 1.5, we can achieve an arbitrarily
(polynomially) small error ǫ in Theorem 1.4.
2 An Approximately MIDR Allocation Rule
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.5. We use a variant of the mechanism of [2]. Instead of sophisticated
convex optimization techniques, which seem necessary to find the exact optimum over the range, we use
a simple local search that guarantees that we get arbitrarily close to the optimum. We begin with some
definitions.
Definition 2.1. For a combinatorial auction with m items and n bidders with valuations vi : 2
[m] → R+,
the aggregate valuation function f : 2[n]×[m] → R+ is
f(S) =
n∑
i=1
vi(πi(S)),
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where πi(S) = {j : (i, j) ∈ S}. We define F : [0, 1]
[n]×[m] → R+ to be the multilinear extension of f (see
also [5]), and P to be the polytope of fractional allocations:
P =
{
x ∈ [0, 1][n]×[m] : ∀j :
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1
}
.
The (integral) welfare maximization problem turns out to be equivalent to max{F (x) : x ∈ P}. This
problem cannot be solved optimally, even for very special classes of valuation functions. In lieu of F , the
authors of [2] use the modified objective function
F exp(x11, x12, . . . , xnm) = F (1− e
−x11 , 1− e−x12 , . . . , e−xnm).
Interestingly, the function F exp turns out to be concave for a subclass of submodular functions, including
weighted matroid rank sums (see [2] for a proof). This means that we can solve the problem max{F exp(x) :
x ∈ P}, which means in effect optimizing over a certain range of product distributions. Also, the optimum
of this problem is at least (1 − 1/e) times the optimal social welfare. Supplementing this MIDR allocation
rule with suitable payments yields a (1− 1/e)-approximate, TIE mechanism [2].
Here, we propose the following simple algorithm that solves the problem max{F exp(x) : x ∈ P} near-
optimally (in the sense of an FPTAS).
Local Search Allocation Rule.
• Initialize x := 0. Let M be the maximum value of any singleton.
• Let g be an estimate of the gradient ∇F exp(x), within additive error δM in each coordinate, where
δ = ǫ8m2n2 . As long as there is a point y ∈ P such that
(y − x) · g >
1
2
ǫM,
update x := x+ δ(y − x).
• Return an allocation randomly sampled from the distribution x.
The required estimates of ∇F exp(x) can be obtained in polynomial time by random sampling, with high
probability. (By high probability, we mean 1− e−poly(m,n) in this manuscript. The coordinates of ∇F exp(x)
are always in the interval [0,M ] — by submodularity — and so this follows from standard Chernoff bounds
[1].) Linear programming can be used to efficiently find a suitable point y, or certify that no such point
exists.
2.1 The analysis
We claim that this allocation rule runs in polynomial time and solves the problem max{F exp(x) : x ∈ P}
up to a (1 − ǫ) factor with high probability, thus proving Theorem 1.5. In the following, we assume that
the estimate of ∇F exp(x) obtained in each step is accurate within additive error δM , which is possible to
achieve with high probability over the run of the algorithm, via a polynomial number of samples.
We proceed via a series of claims.
Lemma 2.2. If the algorithm terminates, then with high probability
F exp(x) ≥ (1− ǫ)max{F exp(x) : x ∈ P}.
Proof. Let y be an optimal solution of max{F exp(x) : x ∈ P}. When the algorithm terminates at x, we have
(y− x) · ∇F exp(x) < ǫM (even accounting for the errors in our estimate of ∇F exp(x)). By the concavity of
F exp,
OPT − F exp(x) = F exp(y) − F exp(x) ≤ (y − x) · ∇F exp(x) ≤ ǫM ≤ ǫOPT.
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Lemma 2.3. In each iteration, with high probability, the value of F exp(x) increases by at least ǫ
2
64m2n2M .
Proof. If the algorithm continues, we can assume that (y − x) · ∇F exp(x) > 14ǫM (considering that the
estimate of ∇F exp(x) could be off by δM = ǫM8m2n2 in each coordinate). We also have bounds on how much
the gradient can change when x moves by a certain amount. Specifically, for (i, j) 6= (i′, j′),∣∣∣ ∂2F exp
∂xij∂xi′j′
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣e−xij−xi′j′ ∂2F
∂xij∂xi′j′
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ ∂2F
∂xij∂xi′j′
∣∣∣ ≤M
and similarly ∣∣∣∂2F exp
∂xij2
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣e−xij ∂F
∂xij
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ ∂F
∂xij
∣∣∣ ≤M,
by known properties of the multilinear extension [5, 6]. This implies that for any x′ such that ||x′−x||∞ ≤ δ,
∂F exp
∂xij
∣∣∣
x
′
≥
∂F exp
∂xij
∣∣∣
x
−
∑
i,j
|x′ij − xij |max
∣∣∣ ∂2F exp
∂xij∂xi′j′
∣∣∣ ≥ ∂F exp
∂xij
∣∣∣
x
− δmnM.
Consequently,
F exp(x+ δ(y − x)) ≥ F exp(x) + δ(y − x) · (∇F exp(x)− δmnM1)
≥ F exp(x) + δ(y − x) · ∇F exp(x)− δ2m2n2M
≥ F exp(x) + δ ·
1
4
ǫM − δ2m2n2M.
Again using δ = ǫ8m2n2 , we obtain
F exp(x+ δ(y − x)) ≥ F exp(x) +
ǫ2
32m2n2
M −
ǫ2
64m2n2
M ≥ F exp(x) +
ǫ2
64m2n2
M.
Lemma 2.4. The number of iterations is with high probability at most 64m3n2/ǫ2.
Proof. By the previous lemma, with high probability the value of F exp(x) increases in each iteration by at
least ǫ
2
64m2n2M . After 64m
3n2/ǫ2 iterations, it will be at leastmM . By the definition ofM and submodularity
of valuations, mM is an upper bound on the welfare of every feasible allocation, and hence also of the
function F exp. This completes the proof.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.5. We remark that, building on the allocation rule in [3], a similar
approach gives a (1−ǫ)-MIDR and (1−1/e−ǫ)-approximate allocation rule for combinatorial public projects
with weighted matroid rank sums that runs in polynomial time in the value oracle model.
3 From Approximately MIDR to Approximately TIE
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.6. We assume that we have a (1− ǫ)-MIDR allocation ruleM providing
a c-approximation for combinatorial auctions with valuations in a class C. We assume in the following that
c ≥ 1
n
, where n is the number of bidders. (A 1
n
-approximation is trivial to achieve by giving all of the items
to a random bidder.) We also assume that ǫ = 1/poly(m,n). We want to convert the (1−ǫ)-MIDR allocation
rule into an (1 − ǫ′)-TIE mechanism. Our approach is as follows. If ǫ = 0, then the VCG payment scheme
turns an MIDR mechanism into a TIE mechanism. The fact that our mechanism is only approximately MIDR
means that the VCG payments might suffer from errors that are significant for certain bidders, especially if
their utility is close to zero. Therefore, we modify the mechanism to ensure that bidders whose valuation
is very low do not participate in the VCG scheme. In addition, we provide each bidder with the bundle of
all items with some small probability, so that their expected utility is not extremely small. Our mechanism
works as follows.
4
Mechanism M′.
1. Let M be a (1− ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule.
2. Let Vi be the valuation that bidder i reports for the ground set of all items. Run M to compute a
distribution over allocations (S1, . . . , Sn) and let Oi be an (unbiased) estimate of the expected value
collected by bidder i, E[vi(Si)].
1 Let O =
∑n
i=1Oi be an estimate of the expected social welfare∑n
i=1 E[vi(Si)]. For each bidder i, run M also on the same instance without bidder i, and denote by
O′−i an estimate of the expected social welfare of its outcome.
3. Call bidder i relevant if
Vi >
1
n7
∑
j 6=i
Vj .
Call bidder i active if he is relevant and, in addition,(
1−
1
n
)
(O −O′−i) +
1
2n2
Vi >
1
n4
O′−i.
4. With probability 1− 1/n: allocate a set Si from the distribution found by M to each active bidder i,
and charge the VCG-like price pi = O
′
−i −
∑
j 6=iOj . Do not allocate or charge anything to inactive
bidders.
5. Else, with probability 1/n2 for each bidder i: If active, allocate the ground set to i and charge 1
n2
O′−i.
If inactive, allocate the ground set with probability 1/2 and charge 0.
We emphasize that O and O′−i are random variables that we obtain by running the (randomized) alloca-
tion rule M. We denote the actual optima over the range, with respect to the reported valuations, by OPT
and OPT ′−i. In expectation, we have OPT ≥ E[O] ≥ (1 − ǫ)OPT and OPT
′
−i ≥ E[O
′
−i] ≥ (1 − ǫ)OPT
′
−i;
however with some probability, O could be significantly different from OPT (even larger, since it is a prob-
abilistic estimate), and O′−i could be significantly different from OPT
′
−i.
In the following, we denote by v∗i the actual valuation of bidder i, and by V
∗
i = v
∗
i (M) the actual value of
the ground set for bidder i. Let OPT+i denote the optimum over the range with valuations vj for j 6= i and
v∗i for bidder i. (Note that OPT+i = OPT if v
∗
i = vi.) Let O+i denote our estimate of OPT+i (assuming
bidder i reports the truth). We prove the following statements.
Lemma 3.1. For every bidder such that V ∗i ≤
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj, his expected utility is maximized within an
ǫ-fraction of his utility by reporting truthfully.
Proof. Observe that as long as bidder i reports Vi ≤
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj , he is inactive and receives the same utility
regardless of his bid. Therefore, his utility could change only if he reports Vi >
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj . In that case, he
might be classified as active (depending on O and O′−i). However, if that happens then he is charged at least
1
n2
O′−i with probability
1
n2
, i.e. 1
n4
O′−i in expectation (conditioned on the value of O
′
i). Since the most value
he can ever collect is V ∗i , he would (possibly) gain from being active only if O
′
−i < n
4V ∗i ≤
1
n3
∑
j 6=i Vj . Since
E[O′−i] ≥ (1− ǫ)OPT
′
−i >
1
n2
∑
j 6=i Vj , it is very unlikely that O
′
−i is less than
1
n3
∑
j 6=i Vj ; this happens with
exponentially small probability. Hence, by lying, bidder i could possibly gain only an exponentially small
fraction of V ∗i in expectation, negligible with respect to his utility as an inactive player.
Lemma 3.2. For every bidder i such that V ∗i >
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj , we have
E[|OPT+i −O+i|] ≤ 3ǫn
7V ∗i
and
E[|OPT ′−i −O
′
−i|] ≤ 2ǫn
7V ∗i .
1By polynomially bounded sampling, we can assume that our estimate Oi is with high probability within E[vi(Si)] ±
Vi/poly(m, n), and the probability of deviation decays exponentially. Similarly for the estimates of O and O
′
−i.
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Proof. We have V ∗i >
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj ≥
1
n7
OPT ′−i. We also know that |OPT
′
−i − E[O
′
−i]| ≤ ǫOPT
′
−i ≤ ǫn
7V ∗i .
The estimate O′−i of the output of the mechanism for all bidders except i is concentrated around its expec-
tation E[O′−i], with variance
1
poly(m,n)
∑
j 6=i Vj ≪ ǫn
7V ∗i , hence we can estimate
E[|OPT ′−i −O
′
−i|] ≤ 2ǫn
7V ∗i .
Similarly, |OPT+i−E[O+i]| ≤ ǫOPT+i ≤ ǫ(OPT−i+V
∗
i ) ≤ 2ǫn
7V ∗i , and O+i is concentrated around its
expectation, therefore E[|OPT+i −O+i|] ≤ 3ǫn
7V ∗i .
Lemma 3.3. Every bidder i such that V ∗i >
1
n7
∑
j 6=i Vj maximizes his expected utility within a factor of
(1−O(ǫn9)) by reporting his true valuation.
Proof. Let us fix the valuations of all bidders except i. Let us assume for now that our estimate Oj is exactly
equal to E[vj(Sj)], O =
∑n
j=1Oj is equal to OPT (meaning that the MIDR mechanims optimizes exactly),
and similarly O′−i is equal to OPT
′
−i. We will analyze this idealized mechanism first.
If bidder i ends up being active, his expected utility will be
Uactive = (1 − 1/n)(E[v
∗
i (Si)]− (O
′
−i −
∑
j 6=i
Oj)) +
1
n2
V ∗i −
1
n4
OPT ′−i
= (1 − 1/n)(E[v∗i (Si)] +
∑
j 6=i
E[vj(Sj)]−OPT
′
i ) +
1
n2
V ∗i −
1
n4
OPT ′−i
≤ (1 − 1/n)(OPT+i −OPT
′
−i) +
1
n2
V ∗i −
1
n4
OPT ′−i = U
+
active.
Here we used the fact that OPT+i is the optimal value over the range with valuations v
∗
i and vj , j 6= i. This
implies that the last quantity, U+active, is the best possible utility bidder i could receive as an active bidder.
In fact he will receive this utility if he reports truthfully and ends up being active.
If bidder i is inactive, then his expected utility will be
Uinactive =
1
2n2
V ∗i .
Now, if it is the case that
U+active − Uinactive = (1 − 1/n)(OPT+i −OPT
′
−i) +
1
2n2
V ∗i −
1
n4
OPT ′−i ≤ 0,
this means that no matter what bidder i reports, being active cannot be more profitable than not being active
for him. When reporting his true valuation, such a bidder will in fact be inactive, because the condition for
making a bidder active is exactly (1− 1/n)(O −O′−i) +
1
2n2Vi −
1
n4
O′−i > 0, and in this case we would have
OPT+i = O and O
′
−i = OPT
′
−i. Other than making the bidder inactive, the particular valuation he reports
doesn’t have an impact on his utility, so he might as well report the truth.
On the other hand, if
U+active − Uinactive = (1 − 1/n)(OPT+i −OPT
′
−i) +
1
2n2
V ∗i −
1
n4
OPT ′−i > 0,
then it is more profitable for bidder i to be active, since by reporting truthfully he will get utility U+active,
better than Uinactive as an inactive bidder. In fact we argued above that an active bidder cannot get a better
utility by reporting any valuation, so the best strategy for him is to report truthfully. In conclusion, the
idealized mechanism rewards a truthfully reporting bidder by utility max{U+active, Uinactive} and that’s the
best the bidder can possibly receive.
Finally, we have to deal with the fact that O =
∑n
j=1Oj is not exactly equal to OPT , and O
′
−i
is not exactly equal to OPT ′−i. By Lemma 3.2, the estimates O+i and O
′
−i are in expectation within
6
O(ǫn7V ∗i ) of OPT+i and OPT−i. The estimates
∑
j 6=iOj of
∑
j 6=iE[vj(Sj)] are strongly concentrated, let’s
say with high probability within ǫ
∑
j 6=i Vj = O(ǫn
7V ∗i ) of the expectation. Also, the actual social wel-
fare of the distribution returned by the mechanism when bidder i reports truthfully is within O(ǫn7V ∗i )
of OPT+i in expectation. Therefore, the expected utility of a truthfully reporting bidder is at least
max{U+active, Uinactive} − O(ǫn
7V ∗i ). On the other hand, the expected utility under any other reported
valuation cannot be better than max{U+active, Uinactive}+ O(ǫn
7V ∗i ), again due to the precision of the esti-
mates stated above. We have also ensured that the bidder’s utility is at least 12n2V
∗
i . Therefore, the relative
error in utility maximization is O(ǫn9).
Now we can prove Theorem 1.6.
Proof. Using a (1− ǫ)-MIDR mechanismM, we implement a new mechanismM′ as above. By Lemma 3.1
and 3.3, each bidder maximizes his utility within a factor of 1 − O(ǫ · poly(n)) by reporting truthfully.
Moreover, the expected social welfare provided by mechanism M′ is at least (1 − 1/n) times the social
welfare of all active bidders in M. (Just considering the option that we used the VCG-based allocation.) It
remains to estimate the loss in social welfare due to inactive bidders.
Consider a bidder i such that Vi ≥
4
n2
OPT ′−i. Since OPT
′
−i ≥ E[O
′
−i], and O
′
−i is a strongly concentrated
estimate, with high probability we also have Vi ≥
2
n2
O′−i. Therefore, with high probability the bidder will
be active and participate in the VCG scheme. The only bidders who do not participate with significant
probability are those such that Vi <
4
n2
OPT ′−i ≤
4
n2
OPT . Therefore, all such bidders together cannot
amount to more than 4
n
OPT . Overall, we recover at least a (1 − O(1/n))-fraction of the social welfare
achieved by mechanism M, which means an approximation factor at least (1 − O(1/n))c. It is easy to see
that the O(1/n) term can be replaced by any inverse polynomial in m,n, if desired.
4 #P-hardness of Lottery Value Queries
Here we show that for matroid rank functions, lottery-value queries are #P-hard to answer, and require an
exponential number of queries if the matroid is given by an independence oracle. We note that a lottery-value
query for the vector x = (12 , . . . ,
1
2 ) is simply an expectation over a uniformly random set of elements.
Theorem 4.1. There is a class of succintly represented matroids for which it is #P-hard to compute
E[rM(R)], where rM is the rank function of M and R is a uniformly random set of matroid elements. For
matroids given by an independence oracle, computing E[rM(R)] requires an exponential number of queries.
Proof. We use the class of “paving matroids” [4]: Let E be a ground set of size 2m partitioned into disjoint
pairs e1, e2, . . . , em, and let F ⊂
(
[m]
k
)
be any family of k-element subsets of [m]. Then the following is a
matroid: S ⊆ E is independent iff either |S| < 2k, or |S| = 2k and S is not a union of pairs
⋃
i∈F ei where
F ∈ F .
Using this construction, we can embed any #P-hard problem in a paving matroid M. For example,
consider the problem of counting perfect matchings. For a graph G with m edges and n vertices, we let
k = n/2 and we define F to be the family of k-edge subsets of edges that form a perfect matching. Then
the matroid M defined as above captures the structure of perfect matchings, since for any set of edges
F the rank function rM(F ) tells us whether F is a perfect matching (which is the case if and only if
rM(
⋃
i∈F ei) = 2|F | − 1 = 2k − 1). Also, the matroid is succintly represented by the graph G, in the sense
that given G we can easily decide whether a given set is independent in M or not. The value of rM(S)
depends on the structure of S only if S is a union of k pairs ei, otherwise it is rM(S) = min{|S|, 2k}.
Therefore, if we can compute the value of E[rM(R)] = 2
−2m
∑
S⊆[2m] rM(S), we can extract the number of
perfect matchings by an elementary formula.
Similarly, for a paving matroid given by an independence oracle, the value of E[rM(R)] determines the
size of the family F , which could be any arbitrary family. We cannot compute this value unless we determine
the size of F , which requires querying all sets of the form
⋃
i∈F ei. This requires an exponential number of
queries for independence in M.
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